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McC.: Equitable Conversion by Will--Right of Residuary Devisee to Rents

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
the distinction between ."residents" and "citizens" becomes important in some cases. It is submitted that the distinction between
these words never becomes important, because, no matter which be
used," - the reasonableness of the ground for the diversity of treatment and the constitutionality of the enactment creating that
diversity will stand in direct ratio to each other.
The result in Hinebaugh v. James's is indubitably correct."
It is too obvious to permit argument that beer, be it termed "intoxicating," or "nonintoxicating," is sdmething that is inherently
subject to regulation and control by the state, and it is equally apparent that such control can be more readily exercised over persons standing in some relationship to the state, either as residents
or citizens thereof, than over persons between whom and the state
there is no mutuality of obligations whatsoever. Hence there is
in such a case a reasonable ground for diversity of treatment, and
as a basis upon which to rest the principal case, this would be preferable to an attempted distinction between the words "resident"
and "citizen."
H. A. W., Jr.
EQUITABLE CoNvERsIoN BY WmL - RIGHT OF RESiDUARY
DEVISEE TO RENTS. - T died possessed of personalty valued at

$265.16, represented by money in the bank, and realty appraised at
$15,000. By will she bequeathed general legacies in the aggregate
amount of $13,510. The tenth clause of the will read as follows:
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal.... I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter [D] absolutely and in fee simple. This bequest is made in addition to the
love and affection which I bear to my said daughter also for the
reason that my said daughter has expended a considerable amount
12 See De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992 (1907), 16 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1033 (1908), upholding a statute making oitzmnship a prerequisite
to the issuance of a license to dispense inebriants. See also, Kohn v. Melcher,
29 Fed. 433 (1887); Bode v. Flynn, 213 "Wis. 509, 252 N. W. 284 (1934), 94
A. L. R. 480 (1935); Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 40

S. Ct. 402 (1920).
is 192 S. E. 177 (W. Va. 1937).
'4 Accord: De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992 (1907);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 S. Ct. 13 (1890); Maxwell v. Bugbee,
250 U. S. 525, 40 S. Ct. 2 (1919) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 639
(1927); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. McNutt, 17 F. Supp. 708 (S. D. Ind.
1935); State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 At]. 723 (1916); Welsh v. State,
126 Ind. 71, 25 N. E. 883, 9 L. R. A. 664 (1890); Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136
Pa. 250, 20 Atl. 583, 9 L. R. A. 366 (1890); Charles v. Fischer Baking Co.,
14 N. J. Misc. 18, 182 Atl. 30 (1935).
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of money in the improvement and making repairs upon my real
estate for which she has not been compensated." Aside from her
funeral expenses of $703.28 at her death T owed approximately
$2,000. The eleventh clause read: "In case my executors hereinafter named shall find it necessary or convenient in the settlement of my estate and payment of the legacies and devises hereinbefore set forth, I authorize and empower my said executors
to sell and convey any- or all my real estate and personal property.
•..." The general legatees brought suit to compel the sale of T's
realty for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate and the
legacies bequeathed to the plaintiffs. A question was raised as to
whether D, as residuary devisee, was entitled to the rents derived
from the real estate of T from the time of her death until actual
sale. Held, that under the doctrine of equitable conversion T's
real estate was converted into personalty at the time of her death,
thus giving the executors and not the residuary legatee the right
to the rents. Peters v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co.1
The general principle is well established that in the construction of wills, where there is a mandatory direction to sell realty,
equity will treat such property as personalty before the sale is
made.2 It is equally well settled that where the direction to sell
realty is discretionary no conversion occurs until the discretionary
power is exercised. 3 However, by the great weight of authority,
where the general scheme of a will makes necessary a conversion,
the power of sale though not in terms imperative operates as a
conversion. 4 A deficiency of personalty preventing the carrying
out of the provisions of a will unless there is a conversion of real
estate into money is such a necessity as invokes the doctrine of
equitable conversion. 5 It would appear from an examination of
1191 S. E. 581 (W. Va. 1937).
2 Lynch v. Spicer, 53 W. Va. 426, 44 S.E. 255 (1903) ; Brown v. Miller, 45
W. Va. 211, 31 S. B. 956 (1898); Tazewell v. Smith's Adm'r, 1 Rand. 313,
10 Am.Dec. 533 (Va. 1823); Hendrick v. Probate Court, 25 R. I. 361, 55 Atl.
881 (1903).
3 In re Gracey's Estate, 200 Cal. 482, 253 Pac. 921 (1927); In re Loew's
Estate, 291 Pa. 22, 139 Atl. 582 (1927).
4 Stalder v. Stalder, 105 Neb. 367, 180 N. W. 566 (1920); In re Sanford's
Estate, 188 Iowa 833, 175 N. W. 566 (1919) ; Falmestock v. Fahnestock, 152
Pa. 56, 25 Atl. 313 (1892) ; In re Vaanuxem's Estate, 212 Pa. 315, 61 Atl. 876
(1905), 1 L. R. A. (N. s.)400 (1906); Battenfeld v. Kline, 228 Pa. 91, 95,
77 Atl. 416 (1900).
5 Stalder v. Stalder, 105 Neb. 367, 180 N. W. 566 (1920) ; In re Vanuxem's
Estate, 212 Pa. 315, 61 Atl. 876 (1906); In re Sanford's Estate, 188 Iowa 833,
175 N. W. 506 (1919).
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the facts, that such a deficiency existed in the principal case at
the time of T's death. 6
The basis of the doctrine of equitable conversion is to give
effect to testator's intent.7 In view of the aggregate amount of the
funeral expenses, debts and legacies and the extent of the personalty T possessed at her death, it is fair to assume that she must have
realized that it would be necessary to sell the realty in order that
the legacies be paid.8
Where there is an imperative and absolute direction in a
will that land be sold, the real estate will be considered as having
been converted as of the date of testator's death.9 The -same rule
is generally applied when the doctrine of equitable conversion is
invoked because of necessity in carrying out the provisions of a
will.'0 Thus, if conversion takes place at the time of testator's
death, the executor and not the heir or residuary devisee is entitled
to the rents of the land accruing between the time of testator's
death and actual sale."
A problem arises where at the time of testator's death the
value of the personalty is sufficient to take care of the debts and
general legacies, but, in consequence of a change in values between
the time of testator's death and the time the debts and legacies are
actually paid, it later becomes necessary to sell the realty to give
effect to the provisions of the will. To cope with such circumstances the Pennsylvania Supreme Court alone has apparently
adopted a rule that "where there is a discretionary power of sale
or there is a necessity to sell ... to execute a will, conversion does
not become effective in law until it is at least certain that conditions
will arise calling for its use."' 2 The difficulty with such a rule
is to determine exactly at what moment it became certain that conditions arose calling for its use. In the principal case the time
6 Peters v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 191 S. E. 581 (W. Ira. 1937).
7 Marcy v. Graham, 142 Va. 285, 128 S. E. 550 (1925) ; Yerkes v. Yerkes,
200 Pa. 419, 50 Atl. 186 (1901); 3 PomFROY, EQuI= JuRIsPRUDENoE (4th ed.
1918) § 1159.
s Peters v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 191 S. B. 581, 584 (W. Va. 1937).
9 Lynch v. Spicer, 53 W. Va. 426, 44 S. E. 255 (1903) ; McClure's Appeal,
72 Pa. St. 414 (1872).
.0 Sampson v. Sampson, 96 N. J. Eq. 198, 124 AtI. 708 (1924); Stalder v.
Stalder, 105 Neb. 367, 180 N. W. 566 (1920).
11 Stalder v. Stalder, 105 Neb. 367, 180 N. W. 566 (1920); Note (1915) 6
R.C. L. 1080; Wright v. Trustees, 1 Hoff. 202, 218 (N. Y. 1839) holds that tho
rents
go to the party who takes the proceeds.
12 Loew's Estate, 291 Pa. 22, 27, 139 Atl. 582 (1927); Schoen's Estate, 274
Pa. 28, 33, 117 AtI. 448 (1922).
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element would be particularly important in view of the well estab1
lished rule that rents belong to the owner of property on rent day. "
Therefore it is submitted that our court reached a result not
only in accord with the weight of authority, but, what is more
important, also in accord with the policy of maintaining practical
and well settled rules concerning wills and their construction.
J. G. McC.
ESTOPPEL

BY DEED -

CONVEYANCE OF INTEREST SUBSEQUENTLY

ACQUIRED AS HER - WARRANTY IN QUITCLAim DEED As BAsIS FOR
ESTOPPEL. -- T devised to W, his wife, a life estate in his property,
with power of consumption of the corpus for her support, remainder to his children in fee, share and share alike. In 1929 A,
one of the children, gave a deed of trust for his share, with covenants of general warranty, and in the same year two judgments
were obtained against him. W died intestate in 1932. A lien
creditors' suit was thereafter brought to subject A's interest in the
property to sale in satisfaction of the judgments. Held, that since
W had absolute power of disposition over the property, and therefore took the fee, the children took no interest unddr the will; that
A had nothing to convey and conveyed nothing by his deed of
trust; that the deed could not operate as an assignment of an
expectancy in the property; that therefore, since the property
descended to A by intestacy in 1932 and not before, it then became
subject to the judgment liens, and the grantee and cestui under
the trust deed took no interest. Swan 'v. Pople.
Under a theory of estoppel by deed this property, an undivided one-seventh interest in the testator's estate, would have
passed under the trust deed, as soon as the son became entitled
to it. The applicable rule is that if a grantor having no title or
defective title, or an estate less than that which he assumes to
grant, conveys with warranty or covenants of like import and subsequently acquires the title or estate which he purports to convey,
or perfects his title, such after-acquired or after-perfected title will
2
enure to the grantee or to his benefit by way of estoppel. It is
i3Rockingham v. Penrice. 1 P. Wns. 177 (1711).
1 190 S. E. 902 (W. Va. 1937).

SIrvin v. Stover, 67 W. Va. 356, 67 S. E. 1119 (1910);
63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410 (1908) ; Yock v. Mann, 57 W.
1019 (1905); Clark v. Sayers & Lambert, 55 W. Va. 512, 47
Summerfield v. White, 54 W. Va. 311, 46 S. E. 154 (1903);
2 W. Va. 470, 98 Am. Dec. 777 (1868).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol44/iss1/11

Blake v. O'Neal,
Va. 187, 49 S. E.
S. B. 312 (1904);
Mfitchell v. Petty,
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